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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
80 S. E. 1007. Consequently it would not be proper to bring forth the bald
fact of addiction unless offering other evidence as required by the rule. State
v. Schuman (1915) 89 Wash. 9, 153 Pac. 1084. But in United States v. Wil-
son (1913) 232 U. S. 563, the Supreme Court held that a witness can be
cross-examined not only as to present dosage (partaking of the drug) at
the time of the trial but also as to addiction alone as bearing on credibility.
In order to reconcile these two views the court in the principal case au-
daciously construed the Supreme Court doctrine to permit cross-examina-
tion as to present dosage in order to attack credibility but to exclude ques-
tions concerning the "bald fact" of addiction. It was felt that knowledge
of the bare fact of addiction would work an illegitimate injury to the testimony
of the witness, since by popular presumption drug addicts are mendacious.
Kelly v. Maryland Insurance Co., supra, 789. But in other jurisdictions bara
addiction has been allowed as a ground of attacking the credibility of a witness.
State v. Tang Loon (1916) 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233; State v.
(1901) 25 Wash. 327, 65 Pac. 534; Beland v. State (1919) 86 Tex. Crim.
285, 217 S. W. 147.
In the instant case the court intimates that in the absence of reliable
and adequate scientific knowledge, the testimony attacking the witness
should be ruled by the particular facts. This view is strengthened by the
view that "Much of the moral deterioration attributed to narcotics in the
past was not deterioration but an original nervous instability or moral
obliquity. . . . No preparation of opium produces an appreciable intellectual
deterioration." Mental Hygiene Vol. 9, Oct., 1925, 699-724. Intellectual
deterioration, therefore, should be a subject of demonstration in each case.
J. G. G., '32.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SUBROGATION-NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PER-
SON.-Plaintiff while in the employ of a contracting company was injured
through the negligence of the defendant. After receiving compensation
from his employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he brought
this action in his own name against the defendant. In Missouri deciding
such a case for the first time the court held that although the statute pro-
vides that the employer be subrogated to the rights of the employee upon
payment of compensation, the employee was not precluded from maintain-
ing a separate action against the negligent third party. McKenzie v. Mis-
souri Stables (Mo. 1930) 34 S. W. (2d) 136.
Common-law rights against negligent third parties were not destroyed by
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co. (1922) 111
Tex. 461, 240 S. W. 517. To hold otherwise would in a sense be to relieve
reckless persons negligently injuring an employee under the Compensation
Act, from liability, though a similar injury to another party would create
a liability. Moeser v. Shunk (1924) 116 Kan. 247, 226 Pac. 784. Conse-
quently a statute providing for subrogation after payment by an employer
will not bar a subsequent action by the employee against the third party.
O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry. Co. (1922) 305 Ill. 244, 137 N. E. 214, 27
A. L. R. 479. Even where the statutes give the employee a right to recover
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under the compensation act, or sue the third party, the courts still reach
the same conclusion. Haynes v. Bernhard (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 268 S. W.
509; McArthur v. Dutee W. Flint Oil Co. (1929) 50 R. I. 226, 146 At]. 484;
Jacowicz v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co. (1915) 87 N. J. L. 273, 92 Atl. 946.
However, if the employee recovers more than the sum paid by the em-
ployer, he is a trustee for the latter as to the amount already received from
him. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Palmer Stables (1927) 149 Va. 560, 140
S. E. 831; McKenzie v. Missouri Stables, above. In some states the em-
ployer is a necessary party to the action, because of his claim to the fund
by subrogation or indemnification. Book v. Henderson (1917) 176 Ky.
785, 197 S. IV. 449. Kinney v. Philadelphia R. R. Co. (1915) 26 Pa. Dist.
R. 502.
Some courts in construing the same types of statutes reach opposite re-
sults. Where the act provides for an election of remedies, an acceptance
of compensation will constitute a waiver of the common-law rights against
the third party. Hunt v. Gako (1923) 243 Mass. 567, 137 N. E. 728. Al-
brecht v. Whitehead & Kales Iron Works (1918) 200 Mich. 109, 166 N. W.
855. Where it is provided that the employee shall assign his rights to his
employer after payment under that act, such assignment is a bar to any
subsequent claim against the third party. Sabatino v. Thomas Crimmins
Construction Co. (1917) 102 Misc. 172, 168 N. Y. S. 495, (affirmed in
1918) 186 App. Div. 891, 172 N. Y. S. 917. If payment is taken in
lieu of any claim against any party whomsoever the same result follows.
Hagerstown v. Schreiner (1920) 135 Md. 650, 109 Atl. 464. Where the
injured party elects to sue the real tort feasor, the employer is liable if
such recovery is less than that permitted by the compensation act. Saba-
tino v. Thomas Crimmins Construction Co. (supra). If a workman's right
of recovery is barred as to the third party, having received payment, and
the employer maintains an action against the negligent person, any re-
covery in excess of the amount already paid is held for the benefit of the
employee. Marshall-Jackson Co. v. Jeffery (1918) 167 Wis. 63, 166 N. W.
647.
In construing a statute similar to that in the present ease, the court held
that the injured person could not maintain an action against the wrong-
doer unless it were shown that the employer failed or neglected to do so.
O'Donnell v. Baker Ice Machine CQ. (1925) 114 Neb. 9, 205 N. W. 560. The
ruling, however, was overcome by a subsequent amendment to the act.
Amended Laws of Neb. (1929) p. 489 c. 135.
Since the Workmen's Compensation Act in Missouri did not intend to
destroy common-law rights against negligent third parties, the instant
case can hardly be criticized. It protects the third party from double lia-
bility and gives to the employer all the rights that he himself would have
had, had he instituted the suit. T. L., '32.
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